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We examine the hypothesis that capacity can be permanently damaged by financial, particularly 
banking, crises. A model which allows a financial crisis to have both a short-run effect on the 
growth rate of labour productivity and a long-run effect on its level is estimated on 61 countries 
over 1954-2010. A banking crisis as defined by Reinhart and Rogoff reduces the long-run level 
of GDP per worker, and also that of capital per worker, by on average 1.1%, for each year that 
the crisis lasts; it also reduces the TFP level by 0.8%. The long run, negative effect on the level 
of GDP per capita, 1.8%, is substantially larger. So there is also a hit to employment. The effects 
on labour productivity, capital and TFP are larger in developing than in developed countries; the 
opposite is the case for employment.  
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1 INTRODUCTION1 
 
The Great Recession which began at the end of 2007 or early in 2008 saw a sharp decline in the 
level of labour productivity (GDP per hour worked or per person employed) in most of the 
countries hitherto considered “advanced”. This is not very surprising; the same pattern has been 
observed in earlier recessions. The standard explanation is labour hoarding. First, firms may be 
hoarding labour in anticipation of a recovery in demand. This could be simply due to the cost of 
firing and then re-hiring or it could be because of the overhead character of some labour. If so, 
productivity growth would be expected to recover when demand recovers and eventually the 
level of labour productivity will get back to where it would have been if the recession could 
somehow have been avoided.  
But contrary to the view that the productivity shortfall is just cyclical is the behaviour of 
labour productivity since the trough of the recession was reached and GDP began to recover. In 
many countries labour productivity did not fully recover the ground lost in the recession, though 
it did in some such as the US and Spain (OECD (2012); Hughes and Saleheen (2012); Fernald 
(2014)). For example, in the UK in 2013Q1, five years after the onset of the recession and four 
years into the recovery, labour productivity was still 4% below its previous peak in 2007Q4 and 
well below the level expected on the basis of the pre-crisis trend (Chart 1).2  
This paper examines the hypothesis that the financial crisis and the recession to which it 
gave rise have permanently damaged the productive capacity of the economy. According to this 
hypothesis, even if the productivity growth rate returns to its pre-crisis value, the productivity 
level will always lie below the path which it would have followed in the absence of the crisis. 
                                                 
1
  The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect 
those of the Bank of England or its Monetary or Financial Policy Committees. This is a 
shortened and revised version of a longer paper (Oulton and Sebastiá-Barriel (2013)). We are 
grateful to Jonathan Haskel, Martin Weale and an anonymous referee for useful comments on 
that version. We also thank our discussant, Davide Furceri, and other participants in the Institute 
for Macroeconomics/Bank of England Conference on “Unemployment, productivity and 
potential output: the aftermath of the crisis”, 11-12 October 2012, particularly Chris Pissarides. 
The paper also benefited from the comments of participants at the annual conference of the 
Canadian Economic Association, Montreal, 30 May-2 June, 2013, and of participants at the 
IARIW-UNSW conference on “Productivity: measurement, drivers and trends” in Sydney, 
November 26-27, 2013. Finally, we thank Kevin Fox and two anonymous referees for the 
Review who made a number of insightful comments as a result of which the paper was 
materially improved. Nicholas Oulton was a consultant to the Bank of England and an Associate 
of the Centre for Economic Performance at the London School of Economics when this research 
was done. The Centre for Economic Performance is supported by the UK Economic and Social 
Research Council.  
2
  For more detail on the UK experience and the labour hoarding hypothesis see Faccini and 
Hackworth (2010), Martin and Rowthorn (2012), and Oulton (2015).  
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These possibilities are illustrated in Figure 1. The optimistic picture fits better with the labour 
hoarding hypothesis: growth returns to its previous value and the economy also returns to its 
previous trend line. The pessimistic picture fits the damage hypothesis: growth returns to its 
previous value but even so the economy follows a track below the pre-crisis trend line. In the 
very pessimistic picture, the growth rate too is permanently lowered by a financial crisis. The 
percentage gap between the new trend line and the pre-crisis one grows without limit, though as 
argued below this outcome is unlikely.  
We also follow standard growth according methodology and decompose labour productivity 
growth into the growth of total factor productivity (TFP) and of capital per worker, to see 
whether either or both of these components suffered permanent damage. Another channel 
through which the financial crisis might affect capacity is via the labour market. It is possible 
that a crisis leads to a long term loss of employment because of the scarring effect of 
unemployment. Even if this loss is not strictly permanent it may be so long-lasting as to be 
indistinguishable in practice from a permanent loss. If so, the long run level of GDP per capita 
will suffer a permanent hit even if the long run level of GDP per worker survives unscathed.  To 
test the damage hypothesis we employ a panel dataset of 61 countries, rich, emerging and poor, 
with data covering the period 1950-2010. We think it is important to study a broad cross section 
of countries, not just the rich ones. If there are indeed differences between the response of rich 
and poor countries to a financial crisis, this needs to be established empirically, not just 
assumed.  
Section 2 sets out some theoretical reasons why a financial crisis might damage an 
economy’s capacity. Section 3 presents an empirical model of productivity growth which allows 
for the possibility that a financial crisis will affect both the short-run growth rate of labour 
productivity and also its long-run level. The size of any such effects must be determined 
empirically. Section 4 introduces the two data sources used in a panel analysis of financial crises 
designed to measure these effects (if they exist). These sources are the Reinhart-Rogoff (2009) 
database of financial crises and the Conference Board’s Total Economy Database (TED) of 
national accounts. Merging these two sources gives data on 61 countries  over 61 years, 1950-
2010. Section 5 reports the econometric results of fitting the model of Section 3 to these data. 
Finally, Section 6 concludes.  
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2 THE MAIN HYPOTHESIS: CAPACITY DAMAGE DUE TO THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE ENSUING RECESSION 
 
There is evidence that deep recessions tend to reduce GDP and productivity long after the 
recession has ended. Perron (1989) suggests that the Great Depression (which was also 
accompanied by a banking crisis) reduced the long-run level of US GNP by about 17%, but left 
the long-run growth rate unchanged: see his Table VII and his parameter θ  in particular; Ben-
David et al. (2003) report similar results. Recall that the US depression started in 1929, that the 
peak-to-trough decline in GNP was about 20%, and that real output did not regain its 1929 level 
till 1939. The fall in output during the course of the Great Recession of 2008-2009 has of course 
been much smaller; for example in the United Kingdom GDP fell by about 5% peak to trough. 
So the Great Depression in the United States was a vastly larger shock than most countries are 
currently experiencing and we would not expect such a large effect on the productivity level.  
Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) argue that financial crises have a tendency to raise the stock of 
government debt relative to GDP, either because of the cost of recapitalising failed banks or 
because government expenditure is not cut in proportion to reduced tax revenues. High levels of 
debt require high levels of taxation to service the debt and this may lead to efficiency losses; 
also high debt interest payments may crowd out socially productive public expenditure (Barro 
(1979)). Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) find that based on data for 44 countries spanning about 200 
years, GDP growth rates fall as the gross central government debt-GDP ratio rises. The growth 
effects are similar in advanced and emerging economies.3 Reinhart and Rogoff (2012) argue that 
the negative association between debt-GDP ratios and growth cannot be entirely due to cyclical 
effects (recessions causing high debt) since low growth is highly persistent in highly-indebted 
countries (so high debt is causing low growth). The very pessimistic case of Figure 1 finds some 
support in Broadberry and Crafts (1992) who argue that the Great Depression cast a long 
shadow over the British economy since it led to productivity-reducing policies such as 
protection and cartelisation of industries. 
A number of other studies, e.g. Boyd et al. (2005), Cerra and Saxena (2008), Furceri and 
Mouragane (2012), Barrell et al. (2010), Papell and Prodan (2011) and IMF (2009, chapter 4), 
also find that the recovery from financial crises is very slow. For example, Papell and Prodan 
(2011) argue that “The preponderance of evidence for episodes comparable with the current US 
slump is that, while potential GDP is eventually restored, the slumps last an average of nine 
                                                 
3
  This interpretation takes into account the critique of the published results by Herndon et al. 
(2013) and the subsequent response by Reinhart and Rogoff (2013).  
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years.” Like Barrell et al. (2010), they argue that advanced countries are different from 
developing ones: the latter can and do suffer permanent damage from severe financial crises. 
The claim that advanced countries are relatively immune to the effects of financial crises is 
based on the evidence for the period since the Second World War. However, based on a study of 
nearly 200 recession episodes in 14 advanced countries between 1870 and 2008, Jordà et al. 
(2012) find that more credit-intensive booms tend to be followed by deeper recessions and 
slower recoveries.  
Why might we expect long-run effects from financial crises? A number of factors might 
reduce the long-run level of potential GDP, and of potential GDP per hour, even when recovery 
from the recession is complete (in the sense that GDP is growing at its long-run rate and 
unemployment is at a level consistent with a constant rate of inflation):  
 
1. In the recent boom, real interest rates were very low, reflecting a mispricing of risk. 
When the recovery is complete and official rates return to normal levels, the rates at 
which firms can borrow are likely to be higher due to an additional risk premium. So 
they will want to hold a lower level of capital in relation to output. Suppose that the real 
interest rate (the required return on capital) rises from (say) 7% to 9%. The depreciation 
rate averaged over all types of capital can be taken to be 8%. Then the cost of capital 
rises from (7 + 8 =) 15% to (9 + 8 =) 17%, i.e. by 13.3%. The elasticity of capital with 
respect to its cost is minus 0.4 according to Barnes et al. (2008). And the elasticity of 
output with respect to capital is about 1/3 (the profit share). So the effect of the rise in 
the real interest rate on the long-run level of GDP is (13.3 x -0.4 x 0.3) = -1.8%. This 
calculation is only illustrative, but does suggest that the effect is not negligible.4   
 
2. Higher unemployment during the recession reduces the human capital of the 
unemployed, by preventing them from gaining the experience that would raise their 
productivity. Of course, this effect eventually disappears when the affected workers 
leave the labour force (through emigration, retirement or death) and are replaced by 
                                                 
4
  Increased uncertainty as a result of the crisis could also reduce the amount of capital that 
firms wish to hold, because many investments can be postponed (the real options effect). But the 
opposite effect is also possible in situations where firms respond more to an increased upside 
than to an increased downside, the growth options effect (Bloom 2014). Gil (2012) has shown 
that for monopolistically competitive firms the effect of increased uncertainty is negative. This 
type of firm posts prices and then has to take the quantity demanded as given. So the profit 
function is concave in quantity. Hence greater uncertainty about demand leads to lower capital. 
However it may be that increased uncertainty just helps to explain the fall in output after a major 
shock but that there is no long run effect since uncertainty eventually returns to a normal level.  
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workers who enter the labour market after the Great Recession is over. But even if not 
permanent, this effect could clearly be long-lasting since youth unemployment has risen 
particularly sharply in many countries. Suppose that an additional 3.5% of the labour 
force becomes unemployed as a result of the Great Recession, that this higher rate of 
unemployment lasts for a period of 5 years, and that each additional unemployed person 
is unemployed for one year. This is equivalent to (5 x 3.5 =) 16.5% of the labour force 
losing one year’s experience. If the rate of return to experience is (say) 7% per year 
(which is consistent with estimates of the return to schooling), then the effect on GDP is 
a reduction of (16.5 x 0.07 x 2/3 =) 0.8%.  
 
3. There could be a long-run effect on the level of TFP. According to this argument the 
amount of innovation taking place in the economy is temporarily reduced by the 
recession. Innovation is implemented through or accompanied by investment in 
intangibles (e.g. R&D, in-firm training, or expenditure of management time on corporate 
restructuring) or it could take the form of new entrants into an industry bringing new 
products, new technology or new business methods. All this is (arguably) what lies 
behind TFP growth as conventionally measured (Corrado et al. (2009); Marrano et al. 
(2009)). Now since innovation is a cumulative process and since the supply of workers 
and entrepreneurs capable of innovating is inelastic, a reduction in innovation in one 
period cannot easily be made up in a subsequent one: in other words, less innovation 
today means that the future level of TFP is permanently lower. For illustration, suppose 
that prior to a crisis, assumed to last one year, the economy is capable of generating a 
stream of innovations a, b, c, ... from the current year t onwards. As a result of the crisis 
the first innovation a is now delayed to year t+1; the subsequent innovations b, c, ... are 
now also delayed one year to years t+2, t+3, ... . Though all innovations are eventually 
introduced the level of TFP will clearly be lower in every year after the crisis is over 
than it would have been in the absence of the crisis. A reduction in the TFP level will 
also lead to a secondary effect, a reduction in the desired level of capital, again reducing 
labour productivity.  
These are of course just illustrative calculations. What we need is a theoretical framework 
which would allow us to assess the size of any such effects empirically.  
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3 A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
It is important to adopt a theoretical specification which allows for the possibility that financial 
crises have both short-run and long-run effects and that these effects may be on both the level 
and the growth rate of productivity. It will then be an empirical issue how large or small these 
effects are. A fairly general framework for productivity growth can be written as follows:  
(1)   1 1 1 2 2 3( ) ( ) (1 )( ) ,
0 1, 0 1, 1, 0
it it it it it it it it it itq q q q q q q q crisisλ β λ β γ ε
λ β λ β γ
∗
− − − − − −
− = − + − + − − − + +
< < < < + ≤ <
 
Here itq  is the log of the level of (labour) productivity in the i-th country, itq∗  is the log of the 
long-run productivity level in that country (long-run is indicated by a star (*)), itcrisis  is a one-
zero dummy indicating the presence or absence of a financial crisis, and itε  is a mean-zero error 
term. The first term on the right-hand side, 1( )it itq qλ ∗ −− , is a simple partial adjustment 
mechanism whereby a fraction λ  of the gap between actual and long-run productivity is 
removed each period, presumably through investment in the broad sense. The second and third 
terms, 1 2( )it itq qβ − −−  and 2 3(1 )( )it itq qλ β − −− − − , reflect persistence in productivity growth: 
aggregate demand takes a while to recover from a recession so factor utilisation is lowered 
which reduces productivity growth till recovery begins; also investment is depressed for a while. 
The third term, itcrisisγ , is the short-run effect of a financial crisis on productivity growth. It 
may reflect a temporary disruption to credit which further reduces investment. We expect that 
0γ < . Note that for the equation to make sense in the long run, the sum of the coefficients on 
the first three terms on the right-hand side must equal 1 and the specification imposes this 
restriction.  
A second lag in productivity growth is included in (1) since preliminary empirical 
investigation suggests that this is justified (but not a third lag).  
A simple model of the long-run productivity level is:  
(2) 0 , ,0 0 0 , 0
t T t T t T
it i t u i t u i t uu u u
q crisisα α ζ θ θ− − −∗
− − −
= = =
= + + + ≤∑ ∑ ∑   
Here 0iα  is a country-specific level effect, the t uα −  are time period effects, assumed common 
across countries, and the 
,i t uζ −  are country-specific, time-varying shocks; all these shocks are to 
the productivity level. T is the base period from which all measurements are made. The effect of 
financial crises on productivity levels is measured by the parameter θ . In this specification 
financial crises can have a permanent effect on levels unless 0θ = . A permanent effect could 
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arise for example if a financial crisis raises the interest rate permanently leading to permanently 
lower capital intensity.  
For any country the mean of the 
,i t uζ −  will be non-zero (probably positive). So split this 
variable into its mean iα  plus a zero-mean error itξ : it i itζ α ξ= + . Then by subtracting equation 
(2) lagged once from itself, the long-run growth rate is found to be:  
(3) 1it it i t it itq q a crisisα θ ξ∗ ∗−− = + + +   
The long-run growth rate is influenced by a financial crisis only while the latter is ongoing. 
Once a crisis is over, it ceases to influence the long-run growth rate (since then 0itcrisis = ).  
In summary, in the specification suggested here, a financial crisis may have a temporary 
effect on the productivity growth rate (measured by γ  in equation (1)) and hence a temporary 
effect on the productivity level. A financial crisis may also have a permanent effect on the 
productivity level (measured by θ  in equation (3)). But there is no permanent effect on the 
productivity growth rate. The latter is assumed to be dependent on other factors such as the 
world-wide development of science and technology and the country’s own institutions, all of 
which are assumed independent of financial crises.  
To obtain an estimating equation, lag equation (1) once and subtract the result from (1):  
(4) 1 2 3 4(1 ) 3 [3 2 2] [1 ]it it it it it it
it it
q q q q q q
crisis
λ β λ β β λ λ β
γ ε
∗
− − − −
∆ = ∆ + + − − + + − + − −
+ ∆ + ∆
  
Converting the right-hand side to growth rate terms:  
(5) 1 2 3[1 ] [1 2 ] [1 ]it it it it it
it it
q q q q q
crisis
λ β λ λ β λ β
γ ε
∗
− − −
∆ = ∆ + + − ∆ + − − ∆ − − − ∆
+ ∆ + ∆
  
(The coefficients on lagged, actual productivity growth on the right-hand side of (5) sum to 
1 λ− . So equation (5) has a sensible long-run solution). Using (3):  
(6)   
1
1 2 3
( )
[1 ] [1 2 ] [1 ]
it i t it it
it it it
it it
q a a crisis crisis
q q q
λ λ λθ γ γ
β λ λ β λ β
ε λξ
−
− − −
∆ = + + + −
+ + − ∆ + − − ∆ − − − ∆
+ ∆ +
        
In econometric form this can be written as  
(7) 10 1 2 3 1 4 1 5 2 6 30
T
it i u t u it it it it it itu
q D crisis crisis q q qφ φ φ φ φ φ φ η−
− − − − −
=
∆ = + + + + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +∑   
Here the coefficients have the following interpretation in terms of the theoretical model:  
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(8) 
1
0 10
2
1 3
1 4
2 5
3 6
Dummies: 
: 0
: 0
: 1 0
: 1 2
: (1 ) 0
Error term: 
T
i u t u i tu
it
it
it
it
it
it it it
D a a
crisis
crisis
q
q
q
φ φ λ λ
φ λθ γ
φ γ
φ β λ
φ λ β
φ λ β
η ε λξ
−
−
=
−
−
−
−
+ = +
= + <
= − >
∆ = + − >
∆ = − −
∆ = − − − <
= ∆ +
∑
  
The sign of 5φ  is ambiguous. The relationship between the underlying parameters and the 
coefficients (the sφ ) is:  
(9) 
4 5 4 6
4
3
2
( ) / 3 ( ) / 2
1
( ) /
β φ φ φ φ
λ β φ
γ φ
θ φ γ λ
= − = +
= + −
= −
= −
  
The first line of (9) shows that the specification imposes a restriction on the coefficients on 
lagged productivity growth:  
(10) 4 5 62 3 0φ φ φ+ + =   
If this restriction is not imposed then there will be two possible estimates of the underlying 
parameter θ . From (9), these two estimates are  
(11) 
2 3
1
4 5
2 3
2
4 6
3( )
3 2
2( )
2
φ φθ φ φ
φ φθ φ φ
+
=
− −
+
=
− +
  
The main interest attaches to the size of the long-run effect of financial crises, i.e. the 
absolute size of θ .  
 We also consider a simpler model with only two lags on lagged productivity growth, i.e. 
where 6 0φ =  so 1β λ= −  and the coefficients on lagged productivity growth are  
(12) 1 4
2 5
: 2(1 ) 0
: (1 ) 0
it
it
q
q
φ λ
φ λ
−
−
∆ = − >
∆ = − − <
  
The coefficient on 2itq −∆  ( 5φ ) is now unambiguously negative. The restriction on these 
coefficients is now  
(13) 4 52 0φ φ+ =   
We now have two alternative ways of estimating λ :  
(14) 4 51 or  12
φλ λ φ= − = +   
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and consequently two different estimates of θ
 
(unless the restriction on the coefficients is 
exactly satisfied).  
 If financial crises affect labour productivity they presumably do so by affecting either capital 
per unit of labour or TFP or both (see the discussion in section 2). We can test for effects via 
these two channels by running exactly the same model as equation (7) but with either the growth 
of capital per unit of labour5 or the growth of TFP replacing the growth of labour productivity. 
For example the model for capital per unit of labour is  
(15) 10 1 2 3 1 4 1 5 2 6 30
T
it i u t u it it it it it itu
k D bank bank k k kφ φ φ φ φ φ φ η−
− − − − −
=
∆ = + + + + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +∑    
where itk  is the log of capital per unit of labour for the i-th country in year t. An analogous 
equation can be used to test for effects on TFP.  
 
 
4 PRODUCTIVITY AND FINANCIAL CRISES: DATA 
 
In the empirical work to be reported below we use the data on financial crises gathered and 
analysed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). The actual data are taken from spreadsheets 
accompanying their book which were publicly available online at 
http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~creinhar.6 The productivity data derive from The Conference 
Board’s Total Economy Database (TED) for 2011 which is also publicly available online at 
http://www.conference-board.org/data/ economydatabase. We discuss each of these sources in 
turn.  
 
4.1 The Reinhart-Rogoff database of financial crises 
 
Reinhart and Rogoff (hereafter R-R) have gathered data for six types of crisis which they define 
as follows: see their chapter 1.  
1. Currency crisis: defined as an annual rate of decline of the exchange rate of 15% or 
more.  
2. Inflation crisis: defined as an annual rate of inflation of 20% or more.  
                                                 
5
  Apart from theoretical considerations, another reason for looking at the growth of capital per 
unit of labour rather than the growth of investment per unit of labour is that the latter variable 
has quite different time series properties: it is predominantly negatively serially correlated at 
one, two or three lags, while the growth of capital per unit of labour, like the growth of GDP per 
unit of labour, is positively serially correlated.  
6
  These data are now available at http://www.carmenreinhart.com/data/.  
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3. Stock market crisis: defined as a cumulative decline of 25% or more in real equity prices 
(R-R, chapter 16, page 150).  
4. External debt crisis: defined as “the failure of the government to meet a principal or 
interest payment on the due date (or within the specified grace period).” N.B.: “external” 
debt means debt incurred under the laws of some foreign jurisdiction. It is usually but 
not necessarily denominated in foreign currency and typically held mostly by foreign 
creditors.  
5. Domestic debt crisis: defined similarly to external debt crisis. N.B.: “domestic” debt 
means debt incurred under the country’s own laws. It is usually but not necessarily 
denominated in domestic currency. (An exception which they note is Mexican 
“tesobonos” which suffered a near-default in 1994-95).  
6. Banking crisis: defined as “(1) bank runs that lead to the closure, merging or takeover by 
the public sector of one or more financial institutions and (2) if there are no runs, the 
closure, merging, takeover or large-scale government assistance of an important 
financial institution (or group of institutions) that marks the start of a string of similar 
outcomes for other financial institutions.”  
Each crisis is measured by a dummy variable, equal to one when a country is judged to be in 
this type of crisis and 0 otherwise. As they note, the criteria just listed define the onset of a 
crisis. When a debt or banking crisis ends is largely a matter of judgement. Their data cover 63 
countries over the period 1800-2010. We use just the data from 1950 onwards, i.e. the potential 
number of observations is 61 x 63 =3843.  
Table 1 shows the frequency of financial crises. For each of the six types of crisis the 
percentage of total years for which countries were in crisis has increased between the first and 
second halves of the whole 61-year span 1950-2010. The increase in frequency is particularly 
sharp for banking crises: over 1950-1979 only 0.9% of country-years were spent in a banking 
crisis but this rose to 19.8% over 1980-2010. The major events were the Latin American debt 
crises of the 1980s, the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 and the current global financial 
crisis.  
Table 2 shows the persistence of crises, the number of crises lasting one year, two years, 
three years, ... , ten years, or more than ten years. Most crises are short-lived with most lasting 
less than three years and very few lasting more than six years. Stock market and currency crises 
have been the most frequent types and these two types have also generated the most crisis years. 
External debt crises are the most persistent when measured by mean duration; next come 
inflation crises. Currency crises have the shortest duration. Domestic debt crises are less 
frequent than other types. Banking crises do not stand out as being particularly frequent or 
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persistent: stock market and currency crises are more frequent and external debt and inflation 
crises are more persistent, when measured by mean duration.   
 
4.2 Output and productivity  
 
The 2011 version of The Conference Board’s Total Economy Database (TED) contains national 
accounts data for 128 countries covering the period 1950-2010, though with missing values for 
some countries. Labour productivity is available for most countries over the whole 61 year 
period when measured as output per person employed but for a much smaller number of 
countries when measured as output per hour. Per hour is preferable to per person employed but 
we do not want to confine the analysis to the richer countries with better statistics. So we have 
looked at GDP per person employed (per worker). The TED has two real GDP variables, one 
using 1990 PPPs and the other 2010 PPPs, but in growth rate form the two are identical. We use 
the one employing 1990 PPPs which is available for more years than the one employing 2010 
PPPs. Population is also available in the TED.  
After merging the R-R data in with the TED, we lose about half the countries included in the 
latter. There are now 61 countries for which we have both labour productivity and crises data for 
at least some of the 61 years. The 61 countries cover the whole planet, not just the OECD.7  
 
4.3 Investment and capital 
 
We also require data on capital stocks. We estimate aggregate capital stocks for each country by 
the perpetual inventory method (PIM), i.e. by cumulating aggregate investment, assuming an 
8% depreciation rate. Aggregate investment in constant prices for each country is taken from the 
national accounts data underlying the Penn World Table, version 7 (the PWT variable IKON 
from the file na70_v2_wo_sources.xls, downloaded from http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/). These 
series are in constant prices in national currency units, i.e. not adjusted to international dollars, 
which means that within each country they are comparable over time. To apply the PIM we need 
a starting value for the capital stock. This is first assumed to be zero and an initial series for the 
capital stock is estimated. The capital stock to real GDP ratio is then calculated for the end of 
the sample period in 2010. (Real GDP is estimated by adding the expenditure components in 
                                                 
7
  The data used to generate the results reported below can be found in Stata format at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Documents/workingpapers/2013/wp470data.zip and 
at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Documents/workingpapers/2013/wp470data.xlsx in 
Excel format. The reason why there are now 61, not 63, countries is that Honduras and 
Nicaragua are included in the R-R countries but not in the TED.  
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constant prices: GDP = CAKON + IKON + EXPK – IMPK in PWT terminology). Since the 
starting date is 1950 for most countries the influence of the starting stock on the end-of-sample 
stock is negligible (it has decayed to 0.6% of its original value by 2010). A second-round 
estimate of the capital stock in each country is then constructed by assuming that the starting 
stock was in the same ratio to GDP as was the end-of-period stock.  
 Given capital stocks we can now estimate TFP.8 Let ita  be the log of the TFP level in the i-
th country at time t. Then TFP growth is given by  
(16) it it K ita q s k∆ = ∆ − ∆    
where k is capital per worker and Ks  is the capital share which we take to be 1/3 (constant 
across both time and countries, in the spirit of Caselli (2005)).9  
 
 
5 THE EFFECT OF CRISES: REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
Section 3 set out a framework within which the short and long-run effects of crises across our 
sample can be estimated. We now seek to test this model using the dataset created by merging 
the TED data on labour productivity (GDP per worker) with the R-R crisis variables. As stated 
above, there are now 61 countries for which we have both labour productivity and crisis data for 
up to 61 years, 1950-2010. Given that our model has three lags of the dependent variable, which 
is itself a first difference, the maximum number of observations falls to 61 x 57 = 3,477. In 
addition some data on labour productivity is missing for some countries, mostly in the 1950s. 
This reduces the maximum number of observations to 3,002, on average about 49 years of data 
per country.  
 We report results just for banking crises. This is because some of the other R-R crises might 
be considered consequences of banking crises, eg a stock market crash. Or they might be 
thought of as responses (whether market-induced or policy-induced). For example, the sharp fall 
in sterling which accompanied the Great Recession and the UK banking crisis was a market 
response (though unlike many currency crises in developing or emerging countries it was 
against the background of an inflation-targeting rather than an exchange-rate-targeting monetary 
regime). So for the United Kingdom the fall in sterling was not a crisis but part of the 
                                                 
8
  TFP is available in the TED but in the 2011 version only from 1992. In the 2010 version it is 
available from 1982 but where the two versions overlap the correlation between the two TFP 
series is not that high (r = 0.83): see Chart 27 in Oulton and Sebastiá-Barriel (2013).  
9
  We have also experimented with the TFP and capital stock estimates in the latest Penn 
World Table (PWT8.0); see the next section.  
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adjustment process. Banking crises on the other hand are very hard to predict: models designed 
to do so have a poor fit even in sample (Corder and Weale (2011)).  
The detailed results from running the regression equation (7), with different dependent 
variables, for the whole sample and various sub-samples, are reported in Appendix Tables A1-
A5. In each case time dummies and fixed effects are included. These regressions are estimated 
by the Arellano-Bond (difference) method.10 This method is potentially superior to OLS as it 
can deal with the fact that the lagged dependent variables are not exogenous so the OLS 
estimates are biased. However, given the number of time-series observations available, the bias 
should be small (Nickell (1981)). The results are first discussed from an econometric point of 
view before we turn to the topic of main interest, the long run effects of banking crises.  
 
5.1 Regression results for labour productivity  
 
Let us focus first on labour productivity. The first column of Appendix Table A1 reports the 
results for the whole sample. Just one financial crisis variable is included, a banking crisis 
(bank).11 All the interesting coefficients are significant and have the expected signs. In particular 
the coefficient on current bank is negative and significant at the 1% level; the coefficient on 
lagged bank is positive and also significant at the 1% level. The test for second order 
autocorrelation (which should be zero) is passed. However the test for whether the two solutions 
for β  and θ  do not differ significantly from each other (see the row labelled “Coefficients on 
lagged itq∆ ”) is failed. So the model has failed to capture completely the dynamics of the growth 
process. But it turns out that the values for θ , which measures the long-run impacts of a banking 
crisis, are not much affected by the choice of solution for β .  
Still focusing on column (1) of Appendix Table A1, the solution for γ  (the negative of the 
coefficient on the lagged banking dummy, 1itbank − ) says that a banking crisis reduces 
productivity growth in the short-run by about 0.55 percentage points per year. This is a 
substantial impact given that the mean value of labour productivity growth in our sample of 61 
countries is 2.01% per year.  
Results estimated by OLS appear in Oulton and Sebastiá-Barriel (2013); the absolute size of 
γ  is a bit higher and that of θ  is a bit lower than as estimated by the Arellano-Bond method. We 
                                                 
10
  An alternative is to use the Arellano-Bond system estimator, but with over 53 time periods 
per country this results in an explosion in the number of instruments. OLS results, which are 
similar, are reported in Oulton and Sebastiá-Barriel (2013).  
11
  itbank  is a one/zero dummy variable for the presence or absence of a banking crisis in the i-
th country in year t.  
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have also experimented with the Common Correlated Effects Mean Group Estimator of Pesaran 
(2006), using Markus Eberhardt’s xtmg procedure within Stata (Eberhardt (2012)). The 
estimated values of γ  and θ  were similar to the Arellano-Bond ones.  
The remaining columns of Table Appendix Table A1 report various sensitivity tests by 
excluding certain groups of countries or years:  
Column (2):  exclude the Great Recession (2008-1010).  
Column (3):  exclude countries affected by the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98.  
(Korea, Malaysia , Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia, India, Philippines, and 
China).  
Column (4):  exclude countries affected by the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s 
(Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, 
Uruguay and Venezuela).  
Column (5):  developed countries only.  
Column (6):  developing countries only. 
Column (7):  early years only (all countries, 1950-1979).  
Column (8):  later years only (all countries, 1980-2010).  
 
For labour productivity the coefficient on current bank is negative and highly significant for all 
sub-samples except for developed countries and for the early years. The coefficient on lagged 
bank is positive and highly significant for all sub-samples except the early years (Appendix 
Table A1). The fact that neither the current nor the lagged banking crisis dummy is significant 
when only the early years are included is not too surprising when we recall that the incidence of 
banking crises was much lower in this period (Table 1).  
Is there something special about banking crises as opposed to other types of crisis? To test 
this, we ran exactly the same model as in Appendix Table A1 but with each of the other crisis 
dummies (for currency, inflation, stock market, domestic debt and external debt crises) in turn 
replacing the banking crisis dummy. In each of these regressions we excluded crisis periods 
which also happened to be banking crises. This can be interpreted as testing for the effect of a 
non-banking crisis when the latter is not accompanied by a banking crisis. For none of these 
other types of crises was the long-run coefficient θ  significant at the 5% level or better. So 
banking crises do indeed appear to have more severe effects.  
Another sensitivity test we ran was to drop the third lag on productivity growth 
, 3( )i tq −∆  
since it is usually insignificant. With this simpler specification the test for the restriction on the 
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coefficients on lagged productivity growth still fails. However, the estimates of θ  were not very 
different.  
 The econometric results when either the growth of capital per worker or of TFP is the 
dependent variable are broadly similar (Appendix Tables A2 and A3). The coefficient on current 
bank is significant overall but not significant for developed countries or when only 1950-79 is 
included. For capital per worker it is also not significant when Latin America is excluded. The 
coefficient on lagged bank, the negative of γ , is never significant for capital per worker, i.e. 
there is no short run effect of a banking crisis on the growth of capital per worker. On the other 
hand lagged bank is highly significant for TFP growth even for developed countries though not 
for 1950-79 only.  
In other respects the equations for capital per worker and TFP are similar to the one for 
labour productivity. The test for second-order serial correlation (which should be zero) is 
passed. The test for the restriction on the lagged coefficients is mostly failed for capital but 
passed for TFP.  
 
5.2 Estimates of the long run effects of banking crises (θ ) 
 
Long run effects on labour productivity  
Table 3 shows estimates of the parameter θ  for the whole sample and for the various sub-
samples. Recall that θ  measures the long run effect of a crisis on the level of the dependent 
variable. There are in fact two solutions for θ  if we do not impose the theoretical restrictions on 
the coefficients on the lagged dependent variable (equation (11) but it turns out that these 
solutions are not very different from each other (Oulton and Sebastiá-Barriel (2013)).  
Let us focus first on the top panel of Table 3, where the dependent variable is labour 
productivity (GDP per worker). In the whole sample, the solution for θ  says that a banking 
crisis has a long-run, permanent impact on the level of productivity: it reduces it by 1.096% for 
each year that the crisis lasts. In other words a crisis lasting five years would reduce the level of 
GDP per worker by (5 x 1.096% =) about 5.5%, permanently. Of course, the estimated effects 
are for an “average” crisis as experienced by these 61 countries over the estimation period 1954-
2010.12  
The size of θ  varies in an interesting way across these sub-samples, though with two 
exceptions it is always large numerically and negative. Excluding the Great Recession reduces 
                                                 
12
  The alternative estimate of θ  based on the second relationship in equation (11) is -1.048, 
also significant at the 1% level (Oulton and Sebastiá-Barriel (2013), Table 7).  
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θ  numerically from minus 1.096 to minus 1.005, or by 4%, surprisingly little; this may be partly 
due to the fact that our observation period ends in 2010. Excluding the Latin America countries 
roughly halves the size of θ  numerically; θ  now also fails to be significant.13 This may be 
another way of saying that the Latin American countries managed their crises of the 1980s 
comparatively poorly. If the regression is run on developed countries only then θ  is 
insignificant (column 5). An optimistic interpretation is that developed countries possess 
institutions able to deploy policies capable of neutralising the effect of banking crises (or at least 
managing things better than did the Latin American countries). A more pessimistic 
interpretation is that these countries have up till now suffered only mild and isolated crises, e.g. 
the United Kingdom’s secondary banking crisis of the 1970s. Or if the crisis was quite severe, as 
Sweden’s was in 1991-1994, it was against a benign international background. So for the 
developed countries past experience will not necessarily be a reliable guide to the effects of the 
present crisis and we should place more weight on the overall results. This is especially the case 
when we recall that Greece, Ireland Portugal and Spain are members of the developed countries 
group. Finally, θ  is positive and insignificant when the regression is run just over the first half 
of the observation period, 1950-79 (column 7). As we have already seen, banking crises were 
much less frequent then (Table 1).  
Our definition of developed countries is essentially the “old” OECD, before the admission of 
some middle income countries like Mexico; developing countries are then all the rest. At the 
suggestion of a referee we also tried an alternative, splitting the sample between those above the 
median GDP per capita (30 countries) and those below it (31). Per capital GDP was measured 
by the 1990 level at PPP which is available in the Conference’s Board Total Economy Database. 
The seven additional countries now defined as developed are Argentina, Hungary, Korea, 
Singapore, Taiwan, Uruguay and Venezuela. On the new definition, the results for θ  when GDP 
per worker is the dependent variable were similar to those reported in Table 3: smaller in 
absolute size and not significant for developed, larger and significant for developing countries.  
 
Long run effects on capital and TFP 
The estimated long run effects on capital per worker and TFP of a banking crisis appear in the 
second and third panels of Table 3.They can be seen to be similar to the results for GDP per 
worker, both overall for the whole sample and for the various sub-samples. For the whole 
sample, for each year of a R-R crisis, capital per worker is reduced by 1.137% (significant at 
the1% level). The effect on capital is significant (at the 10% level) even when Latin America is 
                                                 
13
  This is a Latin American effect since excluding each Latin American country in turn has 
little effect on the size and significance of θ .  
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excluded; however, θ  is not significant when only developed countries are included. So a 
reduction in the long-run level of the capital stock per worker seems to be a consequence of a 
banking crisis and helps to explain the earlier finding of a long-run reduction in labour 
productivity. But this does not necessarily rule out a channel running from TFP, since a long-run 
reduction in TFP would have a direct effect on labour productivity as well as an indirect one 
through inducing a long-run reduction in capital per worker. And these estimates of the fall in 
capital per worker are too small by themselves to account for the fall in GDP per worker: if we 
weight the capital effect by capital’s share (say one third), then the capital channel can explain 
only about a third of the hit to GDP per worker. So the capital estimates imply an additional 
effect coming from TFP. And we do indeed find this to be the case. In the whole sample TFP 
falls by 0.813% (significant at the 5% level) for each year of a banking crisis. But the TFP effect 
is not significant when Latin America is excluded or when only developed countries are 
included.  
The latest version of the Penn World Table (PWT8.0) offers alternative measures of capital 
and TFP to the ones used here (Inklaar and Timmer 2013). Unfortunately, PWT8.0 only became 
available in July 2013, after work on our paper had reached a late stage. The PWT measure is 
(like ours) a stock not a services measure though it does have the advantage of being an 
aggregate of six asset stocks. The PWT also uses the capital-output ratio in the terminal year to 
estimate initial capital stocks. The TFP estimates in PWT8.0 allow the capital share to vary 
across countries and over time; the share has been rising on average in recent years.  
As a robustness check we have re-estimated our regressions for capital per worker and TFP 
replacing our own estimates with the corresponding ones in PWT8.0 (these are the variables in 
levels named rkna and tfpna). This reduces the number of countries by one since Algeria is not 
in the PWT. The results (available on request) show a similar picture qualitatively to Table 3. 
For developing countries the long run reduction in capital per worker and in TFP is significant 
while it is insignificant for developed countries. For the whole sample, the reduction in TFP is 
significant but in capital per worker it is not, contrary to Table 3. Using our own estimates rather 
than the ones in PWT8.0 the effects are somewhat larger for capital per worker.  
 
5.3 Regression results using the IMF definition of banking crises 
 
We have also tested the robustness of our basic results by using the IMF definition of banking 
crises in place of the R-R one. Laeven and Valencia (2010) define a banking crisis to be 
systemic if two conditions are met: (1) significant signs of financial distress in the banking 
system (as indicated by significant bank runs, losses in the banking system, and bank 
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liquidations); and (2) significant banking policy intervention measures in response to significant 
losses in the banking system. They deem the first year that both criteria are met to be the starting 
year of the banking crisis, and consider policy interventions in the banking sector to be 
significant if at least three out of the following six measures have been used:  
1) extensive liquidity support (5% of deposits and liabilities to non-residents); 
2) bank restructuring costs (at least 3% of GDP); 
3) significant bank nationalizations; 
4) significant guarantees put in place; 
5) significant asset purchases (at least 5% of GDP);  
6) deposit freezes and bank holidays. 
They define the end of a crisis as occurring in the year before two conditions hold: real GDP 
growth and real credit growth are both positive for at least two consecutive years. But they also 
impose a maximum crisis length of 5 years. Their series cover the period 1976-2009.  
53 countries in the IMF crisis database are also in the R-R one. For these 53, there were 85 
R-R banking crises but only 55 IMF ones, so on the IMF definition crises are less frequent. IMF 
crises are also shorter on average: 3.3 years versus 3.7 years for R-R.  
87 countries in the IMF database can be matched with productivity data from the TED. The 
results of running our basic regression, equation (7), but with a zero/one dummy for IMF 
banking crises in place of the R-R dummy, appear in Appendix Table A6. The results are similar 
qualitatively to the results of Tables 3 which use the R-R definition. The long-run impact of 
banking crises is of similar magnitude. However, θ  is never significant (though it is significant 
using OLS: see Oulton and Sebastiá-Barriel (2013).  
 
5.4 Effects on GDP per capita via labour force participation 
 
A possible criticism of our results is that the effects on labour productivity that we find may 
reflect differences across countries in labour market institutions.14 In some countries the 
response of employment to a shock to output may be smaller than in others. Adjustment may be 
smaller either because of labour market rigidities which make it hard to fire people or because 
of real wage flexibility which reduces the incentive to do so. One way to look at this is to 
consider the effect of a financial crisis on GDP per capita rather than on GDP per worker. The 
relationship between the two is: GDP per capita = GDP per worker times the employment ratio 
(workers as a proportion of the population). So in countries where employment is rapidly cut 
                                                 
14
  We owe this point to Chris Pissarides.  
20 
 
when output falls, thus keeping up labour productivity, there will be a fall in the employment 
ratio.  
 There is another reason why the employment ratio may fall. If a banking crisis reduces TFP 
and/or capital per worker, or if unemployment or inactivity reduces human capital, then the 
demand for labour (the marginal productivity schedule) shifts to the left. Unless labour supply is 
completely inelastic there will be a fall in employment relative to population.  
 We can test for this by running our regression equation (7) with the dependent variable 
redefined as the growth of the employment ratio (employment per capita): see Table A5 for the 
detailed results and Table 3, 4th panel, for the long run effects of a banking crisis.15 From the 
latter we see that one year of a banking crisis reduces the employment ratio by about 1% (e.g. if 
the ratio is initially 50% then it would fall to 49.5%). Interestingly the effect is significant for 
the developed countries at the 1% level but smaller and only significant at the 10% level for 
developing countries.  
We can also estimate the employment effect by making GDP per capita instead of GDP per 
worker the dependent variable (see Appendix Table A5). We find that the long-run effect of a 
banking crisis on GDP per capita is substantially larger than the effect on GDP per worker and 
more significant: see the lowest panel of Table 3. One year of a banking crisis reduces the long-
run level of GDP per capita by 1.79%. The effect is highly significant, at the 1% level, even 
when Latin America is excluded. When only developed countries are included in the regression, 
the long-run effect is lower though still large, a reduction of 0.79%, and this is significant at the 
5% level.16 In other words, part of the effect of a banking crisis comes in the form of a long-run 
fall in the employment ratio (whether due to higher unemployment or increased inactivity).17  
 
 
                                                 
15
  We are grateful to a referee for suggesting this direct test of the effect on employment.   
16
  Using the alternative definition of developed countries, the estimate of θ  for GDP per 
worker is 1.169− ,significant at the 1% level.  
17
  IMF (2009) also finds long-lasting effects on the employment ratio following a financial 
crisis. Furceri and Mourougane (2012) also conclude that financial crises have a permanent 
effect on (potential) GDP, employment, capital and TFP, but their methods and data differ 
somewhat from ours. Their data comprises 30 OECD countries over 1960-2008 so of Asian 
countries only Korea and Japan are included, and all Latin American and all low income 
countries are excluded (see their Table 1). Their data are smoothed by the Hodrick-Prescott filter 
prior to estimation. Their definition of a crisis is taken from Laeven and Valencia (2008) and 
includes debt and currency as well as banking crises. They estimate a growth rate equation 
similar to our reduced form equation (7) but their test for a permanent effect is whether the 
impulse response function for e.g. (smoothed) GDP declines relative to trend over the decade 
following a financial crisis. That is, there is no equivalent of our parameter θ .  
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The results suggest that banking crises as defined by Reinhart and Rogoff have on average a 
substantial and statistically significant effect on both the short-run growth rate and the long-run 
level of labour productivity. The growth rate of labour productivity is reduced by 0.55 
percentage points per year for each year that the crisis lasts. More importantly, the long-run level 
is reduced by about 1.1% for each year that the crisis lasts. No such significant long-run effects 
were found for the five other types of financial crisis distinguished by Reinhart and Rogoff, if 
these latter were not accompanied by a banking crisis.  
One channel through which banking crises do their damage is through their effect on the 
long-run level of capital per worker. We find that this level is on average reduced by about 1.1% 
for each year of crisis. A second channel is via TFP whose long run level is reduced by about 
0.8% for each year of crisis.  
These results are for all countries combined — advanced, emerging and developing. The 
Latin American countries have a considerable influence on the size and significance of the 
effects. If Latin America is excluded, the long run effect of banking crises on labour 
productivity and TFP is no longer significant and just barely significant (at the 10% level) for 
capital per worker. If only developed countries are included in the sample, then there are no 
significant long run effects of banking crises on GDP per worker, capital per worker or TFP.  
However, we also find a highly significant effect of banking crises on GDP per capita 
(rather than per worker), reducing it by about 1.8% for each year of crisis; this is substantially 
larger than the effect on GDP per worker (1.1%). That is, there is a significant effect on the 
employment ratio. This effect is significant for all groups of countries, not just the developing 
ones. For the developed countries alone, the effect of a banking crisis is to reduce the long run 
level of GDP per capita by about 0.8%, a smaller effect than in the sample as a whole but still 
significant at the 5% level.  
When tested directly, there is a strong and highly significant effect of a banking crisis on the 
employment ratio in developed countries: each year of crisis reduces it by 1.3% in the long run. 
The effect in developing countries is weaker and less significant. This might suggest that in 
developed countries the main damage from a banking crisis is done through hysteresis effects in 
the labour market. In developing countries hysteresis is less important but there is damage to 
capital per worker and TFP. GDP per capita equals GDP per worker (productivity) times the 
number of workers per capita (the employment ratio). So in developed countries GDP per capita 
is reduced because the employment ratio falls; while in developing countries it is reduced 
mainly because productivity falls.  
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A qualification to all these results, including the apparent difference between developing and 
developed countries, is that the banking crisis variable is a one/zero dummy and we have no 
measure of the severity of any crisis, other than the circular one of looking at its consequences. 
Because of this, it would be unwise to take too much comfort from the fact that the effects on 
productivity and capital are not found to be significant for the developed countries. First, the 
effects on employment are significant for the developed countries. Second, it may be that the 
weaker results found for the developed countries just reflect the fact that these countries have 
since the 1950s and up to now (and our data stop in 2010) not experienced crises severe enough 
to generate a statistically significant effect on productivity levels.18 After all, the developed 
countries in our sample include Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. It is hard to believe that 
long run productivity levels in these countries will not be affected by the current crisis.19  
Finally, the reported effects are only average ones. No banking crisis is alike. In any 
particular country or particular period, the impacts may differ substantially from the mean, 
either on the upside or the downside. What sort of policies mitigate the long run effects of 
banking crises must remain a topic for future research.  
 
  
                                                 
18
  Compare again the findings of Jordà et al. (2012) for the advanced countries which relate to 
a longer time span, 1870-2008.  
19
  An important topic for future research is which institutional differences make some 
countries better able to withstand banking crises than others. A referee has suggested central 
bank independence as one factor. Another might be the exchange rate regime (fixed or floating). 
Testing these or other hypotheses will be challenging due to endogeneity problems.   
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TABLE 1 
PROPORTION OF COUNTRY-YEARS SPENT IN FINANCIAL CRISIS  
(61 COUNTRIES), % 
 
Crisis 1950-2010 1950-1979 1980-2010 
Currency 17.4 12.6 22.1 
Inflation 14.1 10.3 17.8 
Stock market 20.3 19.2 21.4 
Domestic debt 2.1 1.0 3.1 
External debt 12.0 8.4 15.4 
Banking 10.5 0.9 19.8 
 
Source  Reinhart-Rogoff spreadsheets (downloaded from 
http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~creinhar).  
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TABLE 2 
PERSISTENCE OF CRISES (61 COUNTRIES, 1950-2010) 
 
Number of crises lasting: Currency Inflation 
Stock 
market 
Domestic 
debt 
External 
debt Banking 
One year 236 65 98 11 44 32 
Two years 40 27 96 4 7 15 
Three years 22 9 65 3 10 20 
Four years 11 8 19 2 2 16 
Five years 2 6 9 1 6 9 
Six years 6 1 7 0 2 8 
Seven years 3 2 3 0 0 3 
Eight years 1 1 4 0 2 5 
Nine years 4 4 0 1 2 2 
Ten years 2 1 0 0 5 2 
More than ten years 4 9 1 0 11 1 
Memo items:        
Total number of crises 331 133 302 22 91 113 
Total number of crisis years 647 524 756 77 445 392 
Mean years per crisis 1.95 3.94 2.50 3.50 4.89 3.47 
 
Source  Reinhart-Rogoff spreadsheets (downloaded from  http://terpconnect.umd.edu/ 
~creinhar) and own calculations. Total number of observations is 3721. Total number of crisis 
years is 
1
N
ii
in
=
∑  where in  is the number of crises lasting i years and N is the maximum length in 
years of any crisis; e.g. for banking crises N =14 (Zimbabwe).  
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TABLE 3 
LONG RUN PERCENTAGE EFFECTS ON LEVELS OF GDP PER WORKER, CAPITAL 
PER WORKER, TFP, EMPLOYMENT PER CAPITA AND GDP PER CAPITA OF ONE 
YEAR SPENT IN A REINHART-ROGOFF BANKING CRISIS 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variable 
affected by 
crisis 
All 
countries 
and years 
Exc. Great 
Recession Exc. Asia 
Exc. Latin 
America 
Developed 
countries 
only 
Developing 
countries 
only 1950-79 1980-2010 
GDP per 
worker                  
100 x ˆθ   -1.096*** -1.005*** -1.112*** -0.550 0.362 -1.258*** 0.831 -1.231*** 
(s.e.) (0.356) (0.380) (0.417) (0.382) (0.278) (0.467) (1.954) (0.382) 
         
Capital per 
worker          
100 x ˆθ  -1.137*** -1.419*** -0.997** -0.755* -0.0423 -1.677*** -0.832 -1.229*** 
(s.e.) (0.411) (0.462) (0.405) (0.392) (0.379) (0.397) (1.122) (0.418) 
         
TFP         
100 x ˆθ  -0.813** -0.718** -0.807** -0.373 0.394 -0.864** 1.019 -0.854** 
(s.e.) (0.340) (0.341) (0.379) (0.329) (0.288) (0.437) (1.916) (0.358) 
         
Employment 
per capita         
100 x ˆθ  -0.959*** -0.825*** -0.954*** -1.031*** -1.311*** -0.411* -1.776** -0.960*** 
(s.e.) (0.256) (0.277) (0.278) (0.237) (0.355) (0.256) (0.872) (0.277) 
         
GDP per 
capita          
100 x ˆθ  -1.794*** -1.574*** -1.849*** -1.444*** -0.789** -1.773*** 0.390 -1.875*** 
(s.e.) (0.372) (0.386) (0.406) (0.396) (0.386) (0.495) (2.170) (0.410) 
 
Note *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimates of θ  ( ˆθ ) are derived by substituting the 
estimated regression coefficients from equation (7), shown in Appendix Tables A1-A4, into the 
first relationship in equation (11); results using the second relationship are similar. Standard 
error for ˆθ  estimated by Stata’s nlcom procedure. In the full sample (“All countries and years”) 
the number of countries is 61, the overall period is 1950-2010 (61 years), reduced to 1954-2010 
in the regressions due to three lags of the dependent variable which is a first difference. The 
total number of observations is 3,002 for labour productivity and 3,277 for GDP per capita; 23 
countries are classified as developed and 38 as developing (see text for an alternative definition 
of developed and developing).  
The data used to produce these results and those of Appendix Tables A1-A5 can be found at:  
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Documents/workingpapers/2013/wp470data.zip and 
at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Documents/workingpapers/2013/wp470data.xlsx.  
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FIGURE 1 
HYPOTHETICAL PATHS FOR GDP PER HOUR DURING RECESSION AND RECOVERY 
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APPENDIX TABLES 
 
 
TABLE A1  
ARELLANO-BOND (DIFFERENCE) ESTIMATES OF EQUATION (7):  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS GROWTH OF LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY ( itq∆ ) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Independent 
variables 
All countries 
and years 
Exc. Great 
Recession Exc. Asia 
Exc. Latin 
America 
Developed 
countries 
only 
Developing 
countries 
only 1950-79 1980-2010 
                  
1itq −∆  0.177*** 0.173*** 0.165*** 0.169*** 0.244*** 0.156*** 0.0468 0.196*** 
 (0.0371) (0.0382) (0.0416) (0.0464) (0.0425) (0.0405) (0.0590) (0.0514) 
2itq −∆  0.0539** 0.0583** 0.0416 0.0932*** 0.0557 0.0425 -0.00867 0.0397 
 (0.0274) (0.0280) (0.0312) (0.0330) (0.0588) (0.0290) (0.0391) (0.0326) 
3itq −∆  -0.0143 -0.0194 -0.0159 -0.00160 0.0550** -0.0309* -0.0954*** -0.0109 
 (0.0175) (0.0185) (0.0206) (0.0168) (0.0273) (0.0181) (0.0370) (0.0283) 
bank it  -0.0150*** -0.0144*** -0.0164*** -0.00990*** -0.00190 -0.0186*** -0.00442 -0.0156*** 
 (0.00349) (0.00356) (0.00386) (0.00285) (0.00285) (0.00481) (0.00717) (0.00374) 
bank 1it−  0.00550** 0.00569** 0.00595* 0.00518** 0.00486* 0.00751** 0.0125 0.00506* 
 (0.00256) (0.00278) (0.00306) (0.00212) (0.00271) (0.00320) (0.0137) (0.00264) 
         
Observations 3,002 2,819 2,534 2,396 1,127 1,875 1,125 1,877 
Number of 
countries 61 61 51 50 23 38 60 61 
2nd order 
autocorrelation -0.918 -1.302 -0.866 0.356 -0.526 -0.603 -1.069 0.863 
Coefficients on 
lagged itq∆  0.00194 0.00429 0.0235 0.000150 0.00376 0.0723 0.110 0.0312 
 
Note *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard (adjusted for clustering by country) 
errors in parentheses. Fixed effects, year dummies and constant included but not reported. 
Coefficients on lagged itq∆ : p-value for 0 4 5 6H : 2 3 0φ φ φ+ + = . 2nd order autocorrelation: 
Arellano-Bond test for 2nd order serial correlation in residuals.  
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TABLE A2 
ARELLANO-BOND (DIFFERENCE) ESTIMATES OF EQUATION (7): 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS GROWTH OF CAPITAL PER WORKER ( itk∆ ) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Independent 
variables 
All countries 
and years 
Exc. Great 
Recession Exc. Asia 
Exc. Latin 
America 
Developed 
countries 
only 
Developing 
countries 
only 1950-79 1980-2010 
                  
1itk −∆  0.477*** 0.467*** 0.509*** 0.531*** 0.488*** 0.459*** 0.395*** 0.468*** 
 (0.0494) (0.0514) (0.0522) (0.0637) (0.0527) (0.0562) (0.0721) (0.0549) 
2itk −∆  0.177*** 0.190*** 0.134*** 0.201*** 0.118*** 0.190*** 0.140*** 0.176*** 
 (0.0274) (0.0309) (0.0304) (0.0365) (0.0367) (0.0288) (0.0511) (0.0345) 
3itk −∆  0.0163 0.0126 0.0127 -0.0193 0.0217 0.0130 0.0293 -0.000694 
 (0.0267) (0.0290) (0.0257) (0.0326) (0.0202) (0.0328) (0.0519) (0.0314) 
bank it  -0.00505** -0.00604** -0.00410* -0.00249 0.00303 -0.00815*** -0.00360 -0.00513** 
 (0.00224) (0.00246) (0.00233) (0.00239) (0.00303) (0.00218) (0.00809) (0.00236) 
bank 1it−  -0.00203 -0.00283 -0.00204 -0.00188 -0.00329 -0.00242 -0.00214 -0.00261 
 (0.00208) (0.00225) (0.00198) (0.00203) (0.00268) (0.00251) (0.00368) (0.00219) 
         
Observations 2,745 2,629 2,377 2,206 1,034 1,711 1,020 1,725 
Number of 
countries 58 58 50 48 22 36 57 58 
2nd order 
autocorrelation 1.335 0.740 0.875 1.950 1.637 1.262 1.118 0.668 
Coefficients on 
lagged itq∆  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Note *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering by 
country) in parentheses. Fixed effects, year dummies and constant included but not reported. 
Coefficients on lagged itk∆ : p-value for 0 4 5 6H : 2 3 0φ φ φ+ + = . 2nd order autocorrelation: 
Arellano-Bond test for 2nd order serial correlation in residuals.  
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TABLE A3 
ARELLANO-BOND (DIFFERENCE) ESTIMATES OF EQUATION (7): 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS GROWTH OF TFP ( ita∆ ) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Independent 
variables 
All countries 
and years 
Exc. Great 
Recession Exc. Asia 
Exc. Latin 
America 
Developed 
countries 
only 
Developing 
countries 
only 1950-79 1980-2010 
1ita −∆  0.172*** 0.176*** 0.162*** 0.158*** 0.228*** 0.156*** 0.0666 0.200*** 
 (0.0457) (0.0464) (0.0520) (0.0561) (0.0460) (0.0505) (0.0646) (0.0599) 
2ita −∆  0.0130 0.0124 0.0126 0.0625* 0.0354 0.000925 -0.0486 0.0193 
 (0.0315) (0.0316) (0.0360) (0.0359) (0.0711) (0.0321) (0.0382) (0.0414) 
3ita −∆  -0.0380* -0.0381* -0.0364 -0.0292 0.0610* -0.0561*** -0.115*** -0.0210 
 (0.0204) (0.0216) (0.0230) (0.0188) (0.0354) (0.0200) (0.0385) (0.0290) 
bank it  -0.0154*** -0.0149*** -0.0159*** -0.0107*** -0.00229 -0.0186*** -0.00318 -0.0157*** 
 (0.00326) (0.00318) (0.00356) (0.00255) (0.00269) (0.00438) (0.00779) (0.00357) 
bank 1it−  0.00826*** 0.00863*** 0.00870*** 0.00740*** 0.00559** 0.0109*** 0.0131 0.00836*** 
 (0.00258) (0.00276) (0.00300) (0.00205) (0.00278) (0.00312) (0.0128) (0.00262) 
         
Observations 2,745 2,629 2,377 2,206 1,034 1,711 1,020 1,725 
Number of 
countries 58 58 50 48 22 36 57 58 
2nd order 
autocorrelation -1.125 -1.135 -0.983 -0.623 -0.972 -0.614 -0.632 -0.299 
Coefficients on 
lagged itq∆  0.339 0.354 0.447 0.0394 0.0313 0.903 0.0115 0.174 
 
Note *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering by 
country) in parentheses. Standard error for θ  estimated by Stata’s nlcom procedure. Fixed 
effects, year dummies and constant included but not reported. Coefficients on lagged ita∆ : p-
value for 0 4 5 6H : 2 3 0φ φ φ+ + = . 2nd order autocorrelation: Arellano-Bond test for 2nd order 
serial correlation in residuals.  
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TABLE A4 
ARELLANO-BOND (DIFFERENCE) ESTIMATES OF EQUATION (7): 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS GROWTH OF EMPLOYMENT PER CAPITA ( ite∆ ) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Independent 
variables 
All countries 
and years 
Exc. Great 
Recession Exc. Asia 
Exc. Latin 
America 
Developed 
countries 
only 
Developing 
countries 
only 1950-79 1980-2010 
1ite −∆  -0.0214 -0.0348 -0.00921 0.178*** 0.356*** -0.0963 -0.0764 -0.0410 
 (0.126) (0.127) (0.146) (0.0649) (0.0589) (0.123) (0.0648) (0.156) 
2ite −∆  0.0558* 0.0543 0.0636** 0.0850*** -0.000661 0.0493 0.00880 0.0327 
 (0.0317) (0.0370) (0.0312) (0.0261) (0.0364) (0.0479) (0.0462) (0.0399) 
3ite −∆  0.00542 0.00891 0.0144 -0.0332 -0.0525* 0.0208 0.00940 -0.0253 
 (0.0266) (0.0269) (0.0250) (0.0469) (0.0286) (0.0258) (0.0641) (0.0311) 
bank it  -0.00456** -0.00419* -0.00548** -0.00466** -0.00615** -0.00356 -0.00991* -0.00448* 
 (0.00224) (0.00244) (0.00256) (0.00188) (0.00281) (0.00271) (0.00522) (0.00251) 
bank 1it−  -0.00499** -0.00410* -0.00391* -0.00413** -0.00386 -0.000742 -0.00869** -0.00528** 
 (0.00198) (0.00212) (0.00213) (0.00191) (0.00258) (0.00211) (0.00402) (0.00215) 
         
Observations 2,992 2,809 2,570 2,386 1,117 1,875 1,115 1,877 
Number of 
countries 61 61 52 50 23 38 60 61 
2nd order 
autocorrelation 0.109 0.190 0.000176 1.519 0.973 -0.128 -0.702 2.266 
Coefficients on 
lagged itq∆  0.506 0.573 0.342 0.0869 0.238 0.754 0.891 0.774 
 
Note *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering by 
country) in parentheses. Fixed effects, year dummies and constant included but not reported. 
Coefficients on lagged ite∆ : p-value for 0 4 5 6H : 2 3 0φ φ φ+ + = . 2nd order autocorrelation: 
Arellano-Bond test for 2nd order serial correlation in residuals.  
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TABLE A5 
ARELLANO-BOND (DIFFERENCE) ESTIMATES OF EQUATION (7): 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS GROWTH OF GDP PER CAPITA ( ity∆ ) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Independent 
variables 
All countries 
and years 
Exc. Great 
Recession Exc. Asia 
Exc. Latin 
America 
Developed 
countries 
only 
Developing 
countries 
only 1950-79 1980-2010 
1ity −∆  0.126* 0.115 0.0985 0.207*** 0.301*** 0.0748 0.0430 0.128 
 (0.0717) (0.0726) (0.0787) (0.0473) (0.0531) (0.0778) (0.0569) (0.124) 
2ity −∆  0.0370 0.0307 0.0389 0.0502 0.0516 0.0141 -0.0457 0.0559 
 (0.0276) (0.0272) (0.0296) (0.0338) (0.0622) (0.0250) (0.0328) (0.0382) 
3ity −∆  0.0207 0.0147 0.0242 0.0303 0.0528 0.00178 -0.0479 0.0256 
 (0.0218) (0.0222) (0.0241) (0.0253) (0.0422) (0.0220) (0.0396) (0.0233) 
bank it  -0.0184*** -0.0173*** -0.0209*** -0.0145*** -0.00748** -0.0216*** -0.00578 -0.0188*** 
 (0.00340) (0.00349) (0.00378) (0.00290) (0.00295) (0.00488) (0.0115) (0.00382) 
bank 1it−  0.00219 0.00288 0.00390 0.00232 0.00131 0.00484 0.00963 0.00205 
 (0.00295) (0.00310) (0.00346) (0.00228) (0.00396) (0.00348) (0.0129) (0.00328) 
         
Observations 3,277 3,155 2,782 2,672 1,187 2,090 1,475 1,802 
Number of 
countries 61 61 52 50 23 38 59 61 
2nd order 
autocorrelation 0.0896 -0.0971 0.416 0.0659 -1.944 0.836 -0.564 -0.111 
Coefficients on 
lagged itq∆  0.0146 0.0485 0.0463 0.000136 0.0120 0.315 0.275 0.0259 
 
Note *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering by 
country) in parentheses. Fixed effects, year dummies and constant included but not reported. 
Coefficients on lagged ity∆ : p-value for 0 4 5 6H : 2 3 0φ φ φ+ + = . 2nd order autocorrelation: 
Arellano-Bond test for 2nd order serial correlation in residuals.  
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TABLE A6 
ARELLANO-BOND (DIFFERENCE) ESTIMATES OF EQUATION (7): 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS GROWTH OF LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY ( itq∆ );  
IMF BANKING CRISES 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent 
variables 
All countries 
and years 
Exc. Great 
Recession Exc. Asia 
Exc. Latin 
America 
Developed 
countries 
only 
Developing 
countries 
only 
              
1itq −∆  0.299*** 0.303*** 0.301*** 0.292*** 0.300*** 0.287*** 
 (0.0451) (0.0485) (0.0460) (0.0487) (0.0579) (0.0472) 
2itq −∆  0.0641* 0.0777** 0.0631* 0.0888** 0.00449 0.0625* 
 (0.0337) (0.0352) (0.0354) (0.0357) (0.119) (0.0351) 
3itq −∆  -0.00124 0.0115 -0.000485 -0.00892 0.0333 -0.00854 
 (0.0318) (0.0358) (0.0331) (0.0342) (0.0520) (0.0326) 
bank it  -0.0161*** -0.0142*** -0.0166*** -0.0135*** -0.0194* -0.0138*** 
 (0.00454) (0.00508) (0.00506) (0.00481) (0.0114) (0.00493) 
bank 1it−  0.00810 0.00877 0.00935* 0.00781* 0.0228** 0.00446 
 (0.00507) (0.00580) (0.00555) (0.00444) (0.0105) (0.00576) 
       
Observations 2,392 2,131 2,182 2,062 617 1,775 
Number of 
countries 87 87 80 76 21 66 
2nd order 
autocorrelation 0.126 0.198 -0.122 0.293 0.459 0.00256 
Coefficients on 
lagged itq∆  0.000679 0.000573 0.000672 0.000777 0.0714 0.00316 
       
100 x 1θ   -1.028 -0.705 -0.926 -0.733 0.429 -1.188 
 (0.626) (0.774) (0.681) (0.639) (0.408) (0.792) 
100 x 2θ   -0.943 -0.637 -0.849 -0.669 0.396 -1.098 
 (0.580) (0.706) (0.629) (0.585) (0.366) (0.739) 
 
Note *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering by 
country) in parentheses. Fixed effects, year dummies and constant included but not reported. 
Coefficients on lagged itq∆ : p-value for 0 4 5 6H : 2 3 0φ φ φ+ + = . 2nd order autocorrelation: 
Arellano-Bond test for 2nd order serial correlation in residuals. 1ˆθ  ( 2ˆθ ): estimate of θ  using the 
first (second) relationship of equation (11). Standard errors for 1ˆθ  and 2ˆθ  estimated by Stata’s 
nlcom procedure.  
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